Wednesday, 14 May 2025
Rethinking Socialist Space in the Twentieth Century
Paul Betts opened by recalling that this volume emerged from an online conference during the 2021 lockdown, a collaboration principally between himself and Marcus Colla. He reflected on how the impossibility of travel prompted historians to rethink “socialist space” not as a fixed rubric but as a series of contested practices and imaginaries.
Building on Betts’s introduction, Marcus Colla examined the impact of transnational history on the study of twentieth-century socialism. He argued that after 1945, scholars stabilised categories—socialism versus capitalism—that now appear insufficiently nuanced. Colla asked: how did socialist authorities govern space as an instrument of power? He showed that Soviet planners sought to shape spatial imagination through schools, factories and collective farms, embedding ideological content in the built environment. Colla’s chapter interrogates whether “socialist space” remains a meaningful category, emphasising its ties to physical and emotional experiences of loss. He further traced how COVID-19’s brutal lockdowns provided historians with fresh insights into the material and affective dimensions of confined spaces.
Tuesday, 6 May 2025
The Long Disenchantment: Reassessing UK–EU Relations from Accession to Brexit
Poggiolini opened by challenging the familiar trope of Britain as a perpetually awkward outsider in Europe, drawing on Chapter 1—“Uninvolvement”—to show that London’s post-war reluctance was neither accidental nor purely inertial but rooted in a conscious strategy of balancing global commitments. She traced this stance to Churchill’s 1948 vision of “three interlinked circles”—the Commonwealth, the English-speaking world, and a potential integrated Europe—within which Britain remained the indispensable intersection . Building on Ernest Bevin’s 1950 reinterpretation of that model under the Atlantic Community, Poggiolini argued that Britain’s early support for the Marshall Plan sought to stabilise the continent under Anglo-American leadership as much as to foster European unity .
Contrary to narratives of “missed opportunities,” she demonstrated that Britain consciously opted for an intergovernmental approach—exemplified by its preference for the OEEC’s unanimous-vote structure—over Jean Monnet’s supranational design. This choice preserved sovereignty but also meant declining Schuman’s 1950 European Coal and Steel Community plan, as ministers feared domestic unrest and erosion of control over vital industries. Far from passive disengagement, this policy of “uninvolvement” only shifted when the collapse of the European Defence Community and the rise of EFTA made continued detachment unsustainable.
Friday, 2 May 2025
The 2025 Dahrendorf Lecture by Robert Kagan - After Paradise: The US, EU an UK in a disordered world
Reflections from the 2025 Dahrendorf Lecture at St Antony’s College, Oxford
At a time of profound global upheaval, Robert Kagan delivered this year’s Dahrendorf Lecture with a sobering message: the liberal order, painstakingly constructed after the Second World War, is not merely under strain — it is collapsing. Speaking with rare candour and urgency, Kagan did not offer a celebration of past achievements but a eulogy for what he called the “American World Order”. The occasion was not, he admitted, one he would have chosen: “It’s not particularly fun,” he said, “to come here as the American spokesman when my country is descending into dictatorship.”Kagan, a leading historian and foreign policy
commentator, traced the trajectory of the post-war international order from its
inception to its apparent unravelling. The order that emerged after 1945 —
underwritten by American power and liberal ideals — was not universal, he
insisted, but real. Within its boundaries, particularly in the Euro-Atlantic
world, relations were largely governed by rules, institutions, and a shared
commitment to democracy and economic openness. “It really was,” he said, “a
liberal order.”
Crucially, that order rested not only on
American might, but on a widespread willingness to accept, or at least
tolerate, that might. The U.S., he argued, defied the laws of international
relations by becoming a hegemon that much of the world did not resist. Not
because it was flawless — it wasn’t — but because it was, relatively speaking,
restrained, reluctant, and often motivated by liberal impulses. This was a
superpower that did not seek territorial conquest, and that — despite its many
contradictions — generally sought to prevent autocratic domination, not impose
its own.
But that delicate balance, Kagan warned, is
disintegrating. The rise of Trump and the ideological energy of the MAGA
movement represent not just a change in leadership but a fundamental break with
liberalism. This is not a reversion to isolationism, as in the 1920s, but
something more dangerous: a major power actively seeking to dismantle the
liberal world order it once led. “We are now faced with an anti-liberal
superpower,” he said. “And that changes everything.”
In this new world, Europe finds itself hemmed
in — by an aggressive, anti-liberal Russia to the east, and by an ideologically
hostile America to the west. The continent, Kagan insisted, must abandon the
post-Cold War illusion that liberalism and peace are self-sustaining. “Rearm,”
he urged. “You will have to live in a world where force matters again.” The
soft language of “strategic autonomy” or “readiness” will no longer suffice.
Liberal Europe, he argued, must now do what the United States long did for it:
defend the liberal order, materially as well as morally.
In a lively and sometimes tense discussion
following the lecture, Kagan was pressed on several fronts. Could liberalism
survive in an age of information disorder, disinformation, and digital
manipulation? Could Europe realistically shoulder the security burden after
decades of reliance on the United States? What of China — was it an ideological
adversary like Russia and Trump’s America, or a more pragmatic actor?
Kagan's answers were candid. He did not
downplay the difficulty of the road ahead. Liberalism, he reminded the
audience, is the exception, not the norm in human history — a brief and fragile
experiment, often misunderstood as the natural arc of progress. “After the
Roman Empire,” he noted wryly, “people forgot how to make cement.” Liberalism,
too, can be forgotten. And in the multipolar world now emerging, ideological
clarity will give way to strategic compromise: Europeans may one day need to
make uncomfortable deals with illiberal states, including China.
On China, Kagan saw a fundamentally realist
actor — less committed to exporting anti-liberal ideology than Russia or MAGA
America, but still operating within a global system that is rapidly shedding
the constraints of shared values and rules. China, he suggested, may see an
opportunity to pose as the more stable and rational power, especially if
Trump’s second term becomes as erratic and disruptive as his first.
The most unsettling portion of the
conversation, however, concerned the question of whether there could be a “way
back” for the United States. Could liberal internationalism be revived after
such a rupture? Perhaps, Kagan said, but not easily. Trust, once broken, is
hard to regain. Allies may forgive, as they did after America’s isolationism in
the 1920s and 30s, but they will not soon forget the vulnerability of having
trusted a partner now in the throes of authoritarianism.
Asked whether Europe could do anything to
support liberal forces within the U.S., Kagan hesitated. International pressure
is unlikely to make a difference, and most world leaders are now hedging their
bets. But liberals, he insisted, should at least make their views clear. “If
another major democracy were sliding into dictatorship,” he said, “the U.S.
would once have led a global campaign to oppose it. That’s not going to happen
now.”
Still, even amid the gloom, a faint glimmer of
hope remained. Liberalism has endured crises before. It may yet endure again —
but only if its defenders recognise that peace, order, and justice are not
gifts of progress, but achievements of power, resolve, and sacrifice. If the
American-led paradise is gone, Kagan implied, Europe must now decide whether it
has the strength and will to build something new.
Thursday, 1 May 2025
Europe and China in a Trumpian world
Zhou Bo opened the panel by emphasising China's recent diplomatic gestures, such as the lifting of sanctions on the European Union, which he interpreted as a clear signal of Beijing’s desire to improve relations with Europe. He expressed cautious optimism that under a second Trump presidency, relations might paradoxically progress—aside from the complications introduced by the war in Ukraine. Zhou suggested that it was unfair for China to bear indirect consequences of a conflict it is not participating in and underscored that although China maintains a so-called “unlimited” partnership with Russia, its position remains restrained: President Xi has publicly declared opposition to the use of nuclear weapons in Europe, and China has not provided missiles to Russia.
Tuesday, 29 April 2025
European defence: How can the EU best work with the UK and other non-EU states?
Wednesday, 19 March 2025
Defining diversity in global higher education: To whom does it refer and why does it matter?
Dr. Sonia Giebel opened with a case study that drew public attention in the U.S.: the 2021 Rhodes Scholar controversy involving Mackenzie Fierceton from the University of Pennsylvania. Fierceton had self-identified as a first-generation, low-income, queer student, but media and institutional investigations later scrutinized the extent to which her personal story reflected that identity. According to Giebel, the controversy revealed the ambiguous and institutionally flexible nature of diversity categories—especially “first-generation”—which are often defined and interpreted inconsistently by universities.
This ambiguity, Giebel argued, is not accidental. Rather, it is built into institutional discourse, allowing definitions of diversity to expand or contract in response to organisational pressures. She posed a central question: is this ambiguity a source of strength—allowing for inclusivity—or a vulnerability that undermines transparency and accountability?
Tuesday, 11 March 2025
The transition away from fossil fuels in Europe: Geopolitical and practical implications
Brendan Devlin opened by acknowledging the scale of Europe’s ambition in transitioning away from fossil fuels. Efforts are already underway on the demand side, from promoting solar photovoltaics and energy communities to reconfiguring electricity systems. However, a major shift ahead involves the deliberate decommissioning of fossil fuel infrastructure—particularly gas systems that have operated for nearly a century.
Countries like Germany and the Netherlands have announced phased closures of their gas systems. Oil infrastructure, while less complex to dismantle due to fewer pipeline dependencies, presents its own logistical challenges, especially in refining. Still, EU plans are on track: by 2027, Russian pipeline gas is expected to be completely phased out from the European system.
Devlin emphasised that this is not merely a European challenge—it is global. The transition demands simultaneous reductions in fossil fuel use and the infrastructure that supports it. Importantly, the EU is not just targeting carbon dioxide emissions but is also addressing other potent climate forcers like methane, the primary component of natural gas. Methane emissions—easier to reduce than CO₂—have risen globally since 2006, coinciding with the U.S. fracking boom. The EU has introduced methane performance standards that could exclude high-emission suppliers from the market.




