Wednesday, 14 May 2025

Rethinking Socialist Space in the Twentieth Century

On May 14 2025, European Studies Centre at St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, hosted a seminar to rethink socialist space in the twentieth century. The event was chaired by Dan Healey, Professor of Russian and Soviet History at St Antony’s, and brought together Dr Jennifer Altehenger, Associate Professor of Chinese History and Jessica Rawson Fellow in Modern Asian History at Merton College, Oxford; Professor Paul Betts, Professor of Modern European History at St Antony’s College, Oxford; Dr Marcus Colla, Mark Kaplanoff Research Fellow in History at Pembroke College, Cambridge; Dr Thục Linh Nguyễn Vũ, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Research Center for the History of Transformations, University of Vienna; and Dr Bethan Winter, Lecturer in History at the University of Oxford. Each panelist explored how socialist states—across China, Eastern Europe and Vietnam—produced distinctive spatial logics that shaped everyday life and collective memory.

Paul Betts opened by recalling that this volume emerged from an online conference during the 2021 lockdown, a collaboration principally between himself and Marcus Colla. He reflected on how the impossibility of travel prompted historians to rethink “socialist space” not as a fixed rubric but as a series of contested practices and imaginaries.

Building on Betts’s introduction, Marcus Colla examined the impact of transnational history on the study of twentieth-century socialism. He argued that after 1945, scholars stabilised categories—socialism versus capitalism—that now appear insufficiently nuanced. Colla asked: how did socialist authorities govern space as an instrument of power? He showed that Soviet planners sought to shape spatial imagination through schools, factories and collective farms, embedding ideological content in the built environment. Colla’s chapter interrogates whether “socialist space” remains a meaningful category, emphasising its ties to physical and emotional experiences of loss. He further traced how COVID-19’s brutal lockdowns provided historians with fresh insights into the material and affective dimensions of confined spaces.

Tuesday, 6 May 2025

The Long Disenchantment: Reassessing UK–EU Relations from Accession to Brexit

On May 6, 2025, the European Studies Centre at the University of Oxford hosted a seminar inviting Ilaria Poggiolini, Professor of European Studies and specialist in post-war peace-making, to introduce her new book The Long Disenchantment. Timothy Garton Ash, Emeritus Fellow, joined as discussant, and Catherine Briddick, Andrew W. Mellon Associate Professor of International Human Rights and Refugee Law, chaired the event.

Poggiolini opened by challenging the familiar trope of Britain as a perpetually awkward outsider in Europe, drawing on Chapter 1—“Uninvolvement”—to show that London’s post-war reluctance was neither accidental nor purely inertial but rooted in a conscious strategy of balancing global commitments. She traced this stance to Churchill’s 1948 vision of “three interlinked circles”—the Commonwealth, the English-speaking world, and a potential integrated Europe—within which Britain remained the indispensable intersection . Building on Ernest Bevin’s 1950 reinterpretation of that model under the Atlantic Community, Poggiolini argued that Britain’s early support for the Marshall Plan sought to stabilise the continent under Anglo-American leadership as much as to foster European unity .

Contrary to narratives of “missed opportunities,” she demonstrated that Britain consciously opted for an intergovernmental approach—exemplified by its preference for the OEEC’s unanimous-vote structure—over Jean Monnet’s supranational design. This choice preserved sovereignty but also meant declining Schuman’s 1950 European Coal and Steel Community plan, as ministers feared domestic unrest and erosion of control over vital industries. Far from passive disengagement, this policy of “uninvolvement” only shifted when the collapse of the European Defence Community and the rise of EFTA made continued detachment unsustainable.

Friday, 2 May 2025

The 2025 Dahrendorf Lecture by Robert Kagan - After Paradise: The US, EU an UK in a disordered world

Reflections from the 2025 Dahrendorf Lecture at St Antony’s College, Oxford

At a time of profound global upheaval, Robert Kagan delivered this year’s Dahrendorf Lecture with a sobering message: the liberal order, painstakingly constructed after the Second World War, is not merely under strain — it is collapsing. Speaking with rare candour and urgency, Kagan did not offer a celebration of past achievements but a eulogy for what he called the “American World Order”. The occasion was not, he admitted, one he would have chosen: “It’s not particularly fun,” he said, “to come here as the American spokesman when my country is descending into dictatorship.”

Kagan, a leading historian and foreign policy commentator, traced the trajectory of the post-war international order from its inception to its apparent unravelling. The order that emerged after 1945 — underwritten by American power and liberal ideals — was not universal, he insisted, but real. Within its boundaries, particularly in the Euro-Atlantic world, relations were largely governed by rules, institutions, and a shared commitment to democracy and economic openness. “It really was,” he said, “a liberal order.”

Crucially, that order rested not only on American might, but on a widespread willingness to accept, or at least tolerate, that might. The U.S., he argued, defied the laws of international relations by becoming a hegemon that much of the world did not resist. Not because it was flawless — it wasn’t — but because it was, relatively speaking, restrained, reluctant, and often motivated by liberal impulses. This was a superpower that did not seek territorial conquest, and that — despite its many contradictions — generally sought to prevent autocratic domination, not impose its own.

But that delicate balance, Kagan warned, is disintegrating. The rise of Trump and the ideological energy of the MAGA movement represent not just a change in leadership but a fundamental break with liberalism. This is not a reversion to isolationism, as in the 1920s, but something more dangerous: a major power actively seeking to dismantle the liberal world order it once led. “We are now faced with an anti-liberal superpower,” he said. “And that changes everything.”

In this new world, Europe finds itself hemmed in — by an aggressive, anti-liberal Russia to the east, and by an ideologically hostile America to the west. The continent, Kagan insisted, must abandon the post-Cold War illusion that liberalism and peace are self-sustaining. “Rearm,” he urged. “You will have to live in a world where force matters again.” The soft language of “strategic autonomy” or “readiness” will no longer suffice. Liberal Europe, he argued, must now do what the United States long did for it: defend the liberal order, materially as well as morally.

In a lively and sometimes tense discussion following the lecture, Kagan was pressed on several fronts. Could liberalism survive in an age of information disorder, disinformation, and digital manipulation? Could Europe realistically shoulder the security burden after decades of reliance on the United States? What of China — was it an ideological adversary like Russia and Trump’s America, or a more pragmatic actor?

Kagan's answers were candid. He did not downplay the difficulty of the road ahead. Liberalism, he reminded the audience, is the exception, not the norm in human history — a brief and fragile experiment, often misunderstood as the natural arc of progress. “After the Roman Empire,” he noted wryly, “people forgot how to make cement.” Liberalism, too, can be forgotten. And in the multipolar world now emerging, ideological clarity will give way to strategic compromise: Europeans may one day need to make uncomfortable deals with illiberal states, including China.

On China, Kagan saw a fundamentally realist actor — less committed to exporting anti-liberal ideology than Russia or MAGA America, but still operating within a global system that is rapidly shedding the constraints of shared values and rules. China, he suggested, may see an opportunity to pose as the more stable and rational power, especially if Trump’s second term becomes as erratic and disruptive as his first.

The most unsettling portion of the conversation, however, concerned the question of whether there could be a “way back” for the United States. Could liberal internationalism be revived after such a rupture? Perhaps, Kagan said, but not easily. Trust, once broken, is hard to regain. Allies may forgive, as they did after America’s isolationism in the 1920s and 30s, but they will not soon forget the vulnerability of having trusted a partner now in the throes of authoritarianism.

Asked whether Europe could do anything to support liberal forces within the U.S., Kagan hesitated. International pressure is unlikely to make a difference, and most world leaders are now hedging their bets. But liberals, he insisted, should at least make their views clear. “If another major democracy were sliding into dictatorship,” he said, “the U.S. would once have led a global campaign to oppose it. That’s not going to happen now.”

Still, even amid the gloom, a faint glimmer of hope remained. Liberalism has endured crises before. It may yet endure again — but only if its defenders recognise that peace, order, and justice are not gifts of progress, but achievements of power, resolve, and sacrifice. If the American-led paradise is gone, Kagan implied, Europe must now decide whether it has the strength and will to build something new.

Thursday, 1 May 2025

Europe and China in a Trumpian world

On May 1, 2025, the European Studies Centre of Oxford University welcomed Bo Zhou, Senior Fellow and China Forum Expert at Tsinghua University; Yang Yao, Professor and Director of the China Centre for Economic Research and Dean of the National School of Development at Peking University; and Janka Oertel, Director of the Asia Programme and Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, to discuss the evolving relationship between Europe and China under the shadow of a potential second Trump administration. The event was chaired by Isabel Hilton, journalist, broadcaster, and Visiting Professor at the Lau Institute at King’s College London. The discussion was wide-ranging, covering structural economic challenges, manufacturing competition, foreign direct investment, and the future of global trade norms.

Zhou Bo opened the panel by emphasising China's recent diplomatic gestures, such as the lifting of sanctions on the European Union, which he interpreted as a clear signal of Beijing’s desire to improve relations with Europe. He expressed cautious optimism that under a second Trump presidency, relations might paradoxically progress—aside from the complications introduced by the war in Ukraine. Zhou suggested that it was unfair for China to bear indirect consequences of a conflict it is not participating in and underscored that although China maintains a so-called “unlimited” partnership with Russia, its position remains restrained: President Xi has publicly declared opposition to the use of nuclear weapons in Europe, and China has not provided missiles to Russia.

Tuesday, 29 April 2025

European defence: How can the EU best work with the UK and other non-EU states?

On April 29, 2025, a seminar at St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, brought together experts to examine how the European Union can best engage with the United Kingdom and other non-EU states in the context of evolving security and defence challenges. The panel featured Brendan Devlin, EU Visiting Fellow at St Antony’s College; Luigi Scazzieri, Senior Policy Analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies; and Armida van Rij, Senior Research Fellow at Chatham House. The discussion was chaired by Professor Timothy Garton Ash, Professor of European Studies at St Antony’s College. The speakers offered insights into the potential for a new European Defence Procurement Treaty, the implications for non-EU states such as the UK, and the broader geopolitical and institutional dynamics shaping European defence cooperation.

Brendan Devlin introduced the idea of a European Defence Procurement Treaty that would include both EU and non-EU countries. Drawing on the 2005 Energy Community Treaty as a precedent, he proposed a treaty framework that would operate under qualified majority voting, allowing it to function efficiently despite an expanded membership. He stressed the importance of ensuring “equivalence of esteem” for non-EU countries, in contrast to the EU’s traditional enlargement approach, which he described as a "take-it-or-leave-it" process that limits third countries’ influence. Devlin also argued for granting the treaty legal personality and rights, which would allow it to administer funds and engage in host government agreements. He proposed that participation should not be contingent on accepting the EU’s four fundamental freedoms, thereby offering flexibility for third-country involvement. Additionally, he suggested that the treaty include provisional application and sunset clauses to enable it to enter into force before full ratification and to allow it to expire automatically over time, avoiding the pitfalls of institutional permanence. He noted that EU directives—specifically Directives 2009/81/EC and 2009/43/EC—could serve as a legal foundation for this treaty, although he emphasised that real progress would require political initiative and a shared strategic outlook.

Wednesday, 19 March 2025

Defining diversity in global higher education: To whom does it refer and why does it matter?

On 19 March 2025, the ESC hosted a seminar exploring evolving definitions and practices of diversity in higher education, particularly in the United States and Germany. The discussion featured Sonia Giebel, Dahrendorf Postdoctoral Fellow at St Antony's, and David Johnson (St Antony’s College, Oxford). The seminar was chaired by Othon Anastasakis.

Dr. Sonia Giebel opened with a case study that drew public attention in the U.S.: the 2021 Rhodes Scholar controversy involving Mackenzie Fierceton from the University of Pennsylvania. Fierceton had self-identified as a first-generation, low-income, queer student, but media and institutional investigations later scrutinized the extent to which her personal story reflected that identity. According to Giebel, the controversy revealed the ambiguous and institutionally flexible nature of diversity categories—especially “first-generation”—which are often defined and interpreted inconsistently by universities.

This ambiguity, Giebel argued, is not accidental. Rather, it is built into institutional discourse, allowing definitions of diversity to expand or contract in response to organisational pressures. She posed a central question: is this ambiguity a source of strength—allowing for inclusivity—or a vulnerability that undermines transparency and accountability?

Tuesday, 11 March 2025

The transition away from fossil fuels in Europe: Geopolitical and practical implications

On 11 March 2025, the ESC hosted a seminar on the practical and geopolitical implications of Europe’s energy transition away from fossil fuels. The discussion featured Brendan Devlin, EU Visiting Fellow at St Antony’s College, and Anthony Calacino, Postdoctoral Researcher at Oxford’s Department of Politics and International Relations. The session was chaired by David Madden, Honorary Antonian at St Antony's.

Brendan Devlin opened by acknowledging the scale of Europe’s ambition in transitioning away from fossil fuels. Efforts are already underway on the demand side, from promoting solar photovoltaics and energy communities to reconfiguring electricity systems. However, a major shift ahead involves the deliberate decommissioning of fossil fuel infrastructure—particularly gas systems that have operated for nearly a century.

Countries like Germany and the Netherlands have announced phased closures of their gas systems. Oil infrastructure, while less complex to dismantle due to fewer pipeline dependencies, presents its own logistical challenges, especially in refining. Still, EU plans are on track: by 2027, Russian pipeline gas is expected to be completely phased out from the European system.

Devlin emphasised that this is not merely a European challenge—it is global. The transition demands simultaneous reductions in fossil fuel use and the infrastructure that supports it. Importantly, the EU is not just targeting carbon dioxide emissions but is also addressing other potent climate forcers like methane, the primary component of natural gas. Methane emissions—easier to reduce than CO₂—have risen globally since 2006, coinciding with the U.S. fracking boom. The EU has introduced methane performance standards that could exclude high-emission suppliers from the market.