Brendan Devlin opened by acknowledging the scale of Europe’s ambition in transitioning away from fossil fuels. Efforts are already underway on the demand side, from promoting solar photovoltaics and energy communities to reconfiguring electricity systems. However, a major shift ahead involves the deliberate decommissioning of fossil fuel infrastructure—particularly gas systems that have operated for nearly a century.
Countries like Germany and the Netherlands have announced phased closures of their gas systems. Oil infrastructure, while less complex to dismantle due to fewer pipeline dependencies, presents its own logistical challenges, especially in refining. Still, EU plans are on track: by 2027, Russian pipeline gas is expected to be completely phased out from the European system.
Devlin emphasised that this is not merely a European challenge—it is global. The transition demands simultaneous reductions in fossil fuel use and the infrastructure that supports it. Importantly, the EU is not just targeting carbon dioxide emissions but is also addressing other potent climate forcers like methane, the primary component of natural gas. Methane emissions—easier to reduce than CO₂—have risen globally since 2006, coinciding with the U.S. fracking boom. The EU has introduced methane performance standards that could exclude high-emission suppliers from the market.One of the most striking figures Devlin presented was from the International Energy Agency (IEA): a projected global loss of $18 trillion in government revenue from oil and gas over the next two decades. This decline poses serious fiscal challenges for hydrocarbon-dependent states like Iraq and Algeria. In Algeria, for instance, falling oil revenues combined with population growth have caused a sharp drop in per capita income—an economic pressure with far-reaching political implications.
Devlin warned of an investment dilemma: while consumer countries like the EU must reduce fossil fuel demand, they also have a responsibility not to impoverish supplier countries in the process. Without carefully managed partnerships, there is a risk that producer countries will respond by accelerating extraction and sales, undermining global decarbonisation goals. The EU must explore policy options that coordinate these transitions while avoiding system-wide disruptions—such as unilateral closures or un-sequenced phaseouts that could have destabilising cross-border impacts.
Dr. Anthony Calacino offered a complementary perspective, situating Europe’s energy transition within a broader framework of climate justice and global political economy. He outlined four potential strategies the EU could adopt, ranging from a laissez-faire, market-driven model to one grounded in fairness and historical responsibility.
Calacino questioned the normative legitimacy of the market-based “do nothing” approach, noting that it risks leaving fossil fuel-dependent countries behind. Under a fairness-based strategy, the EU would prioritise disengagement from suppliers in the Global North—such as the United States—while maintaining energy purchases from countries with fewer historical emissions and greater development needs. However, he admitted the political viability of such an approach remains highly uncertain, particularly in a European political climate increasingly influenced by right-wing populism.
He also highlighted the “resource curse” dilemma: countries rich in fossil fuels often experience weakened democratic institutions and higher risks of conflict. While cutting off fossil fuel revenue may seem desirable from a climate perspective, it could exacerbate instability unless carefully managed through international investment and development agreements.
Africa was a focal point of Calacino’s remarks. While oil-exporting states like Algeria are fiscally vulnerable, oil revenues are often unequally distributed domestically. Thus, the consequences of energy transition may not be uniformly negative. He also flagged other key producers such as Brazil, Angola, and Pakistan, asking whether the EU has sufficiently considered their perspectives and long-term interests.
In response, Devlin acknowledged the difficulty of establishing structural dialogues with producer countries. Many such relationships remain adversarial, particularly where civil society actors view EU policy as coercive. Yet without credible decarbonisation commitments from Europe, Devlin argued, no meaningful dialogue on trade or industrial cooperation is possible. He noted that vested interests among producer country elites—particularly in the Middle East—often resist structural change.
The discussion returned repeatedly to questions of credibility and fairness. Both speakers agreed that the EU must be seen as a consistent and principled actor if it hopes to secure long-term cooperation. However, the political and institutional capacity to deliver such a vision remains in question.
The seminar highlighted the geopolitical and institutional complexity of phasing out fossil fuels in Europe. As the EU pushes forward with ambitious decarbonisation targets, it must confront the global ripple effects of reduced demand—especially in regions with high fiscal dependency on oil and gas. Balancing climate goals with fairness, political stability, and international cooperation will require more than market mechanisms. It will demand credible strategies, sustained engagement with producer countries, and a willingness to reconcile internal energy security with external development realities.
by Yangyang Zhao (ESC Research Assistant)
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