Poggiolini opened by challenging the familiar trope of Britain as a perpetually awkward outsider in Europe, drawing on Chapter 1—“Uninvolvement”—to show that London’s post-war reluctance was neither accidental nor purely inertial but rooted in a conscious strategy of balancing global commitments. She traced this stance to Churchill’s 1948 vision of “three interlinked circles”—the Commonwealth, the English-speaking world, and a potential integrated Europe—within which Britain remained the indispensable intersection . Building on Ernest Bevin’s 1950 reinterpretation of that model under the Atlantic Community, Poggiolini argued that Britain’s early support for the Marshall Plan sought to stabilise the continent under Anglo-American leadership as much as to foster European unity .
Contrary to narratives of “missed opportunities,” she demonstrated that Britain consciously opted for an intergovernmental approach—exemplified by its preference for the OEEC’s unanimous-vote structure—over Jean Monnet’s supranational design. This choice preserved sovereignty but also meant declining Schuman’s 1950 European Coal and Steel Community plan, as ministers feared domestic unrest and erosion of control over vital industries. Far from passive disengagement, this policy of “uninvolvement” only shifted when the collapse of the European Defence Community and the rise of EFTA made continued detachment unsustainable.Weaving in her seminar notes, Poggiolini highlighted how these early decisions set the tone for later narratives of British exceptionalism. Post-victory dignity veiled an underlying inferiority complex and a habitual “take-what-you-need” pragmatism, which resurfaced in Heath’s trilateral diplomacy with France and Germany and in Thatcher’s single-market crusade. In this sense, studies on Brexit should see Britain’s accession debates not as reactive concessions but as episodes in an ongoing process of adaptive negotiation.
Timothy Garton Ash responded by praising Poggiolini’s archival rigour—her use of Foreign Office memoranda and cabinet debates to recast “reluctance” as a nuanced strategy—and by reframing the question of enchantment. He noted that Britain’s confidence in thriving outside the EU was as significant as any scepticism, a theme that spans from the circles model to Thatcher’s Bruges speech. Ultimately, he warned, the greatest consequence of Britain’s departure is the erosion of its geopolitical influence and soft power. Quoting Churchill’s remark that Britain’s absence “deranges” the balance of Europe, he suggested that without a British counterweight, the Union risks both internal imbalance and diminished global standing.
During the Q&A, Poggiolini addressed whether British people still view themselves as Europeans. She pointed to a growing “island between the U.S. and Europe” narrative under Trumpian U.S. pressures. Ash pointed out that “betrayal” might better capture continental disappointment than “disenchantment” for the U.K., reflecting a deeper sense of abandonment after decades of partnership, and warned of a “creeping alienation” in which even pro-Europeans regard Brussels as an external authority.
The Long Disenchantment seeks to replace the comforting narrative of British missed opportunities with a chronicle of UK–EC/EU relations’ true complexity. After nearly a decade of Brexit, Poggiolini revisits Britain’s journey from post-war “uninvolvement” to accession, single-market leadership, and ultimately Brexit, building on an in-depth study of primary and secondary sources. By reframing Britain not as a hapless outsider but as an assertive actor negotiating its place between empire, alliance, and community, she invites scholars and decision-makers alike to rethink the dominant story of inevitable alienation and to explore the possibility of a more balanced “second Europe.”
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