Krastev’s lecture
focused on the importance and influence of demography on contemporary politics.
It sought to weave together demographic trends – low fertility rates and aging
populations – with migratory flows, national identity, feelings of anxiety
about the future the nation, and warfare. He outlined the traits of his ‘last
man’. While Fukuyama’s ‘last man’ was satisfied but not ambitious, ‘married’ to
democracy but not in love with it, Krastev’s ‘last man’ is full of anxieties
and terrified that his nation is on the edge of extinction. He is the last
European, the last white man – terrified of the extinction of the political
power of his nation or race. Krastev characterised this as ‘demographic
bulimia’ – an anxious feeling driven by the perception that they are
simultaneously too many and too few people on a specific territory: too many of
‘them’ and too few of ‘us’.
The central argument of Krastev’s lecture was that demographic imagination is a new substitute for political ideology, and that demographic transition and democratic transition are closely interlinked. He substantiated his central argument by positing that: (1) demography and demographic imagination are key to understand the changes in both domestic and international politics; (2) while demographic change will affect both authoritarian and democratic regimes, at least initially it will have much more destabilising effect on democracies; (3) demographic changes and the need of migration that they bring put the focus on the rights of the majorities and as a result they expose the two conflicting notions of ‘the majority’ – the ethnic majority and the electoral majority; (4) while demographic anxiety fuels political support for the far right both in Eastern and the Western Europe, the fears in these geographical areas lead to two different types of illiberal regimes.
He noted the
demographic dimensions of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and argued that Putin’s
war objectives were related far more to demography rather than territory. To
support this argument, he cited the kidnapping of Ukrainian children by Russia
and posited that through the invasion and the intended inclusion of 40 million
Ukrainians into Russia. According to Krastev, Putin sought to reverse Russia’s
demographic decline by attempting to annex Ukraine and deny to Ukrainians their
national identity. Demographic considerations are important also for Ukraine,
since Krastev believes that Ukraine has not mobilised its youth – ages 18-27 – because
it hopes to preserve the demographic potential of the nation.
Krastev further argued
that power changes when people change their minds or when the people themselves
change. He cited the influx of Jews from the former Soviet Union to Israel and
the unification of Germany as examples where the inclusion of communities with
different political cultures significantly shapes the political discourse. He
argued that changing demographics change the political weight of the former
ethnic majority that established the state but whose members feel as if their
political voice is being drowned by the electoral majority of the foreigners
who have become part of their countries. Krastev considers these two
conflicting notions of ‘majority’ as the heart of the current crisis of
democracies in the West.
These types of extinction
anxieties are more accentuated in Eastern European countries, according to
Krastev, because they are imbedded in the history of these nation-states. The
anxieties are born out of low fertility rates, migratory outflows, and
migratory inflows that bring the ‘other’ into these countries. Minorities in
Eastern European states have been seen with suspicion, according to Krastev, and
he cited the efforts of Czechoslovakia to homogenise its population after
feeling that their German minority had betrayed the rest of the country during
the Second World War.
Krastev ended his
lecture by making two further observations. He noted that demographic change is
changing the generational composition of societies. Therefore in countries with
low fertility rates and significant migration outflows, the older generation
that remain will tend to be more conservative and illiberal. He also noted that
the Covid-19 pandemic has made people more prone to think in terms of
demographic projections and demographic imagination because the impact of the
virus on the elderly population and the ubiquitous Covid-related demographic
data made people more aware of our mortality and the impact of demographics on
daily life and their communities.
A rich discussion
followed the lecture. The discussion focused on questions of national identity,
the economic dimension of migration flows and fertility rates, their relation
to neoliberalism, and the role of political parties as drivers of demographic
imagination.
No comments:
Post a Comment