The speaker began his presentation by introducing the material and legal impacts of the First World War. Millions of people lost property through both damage and requisitioning, the goods ranging from entire companies to hotel linens and towels. Germany’s case was particularly serious: 40% of the country’s income was generated abroad, and it lost three times as much money from confiscation by the Allied powers than vice versa, with the Allies appropriating two thirds of the country’s capital stock. On the other hand, the war largely took place on Allied territory, and so in its closing months, public pressure grew to make Germany pay.
Allied discourse framed reparations as the basis of a just post-war settlement, generating a novel idea: that wronged individuals should not be left defenceless before their own or another state. The idea completely changed old notions regarding international law. Private individuals could now bring their case before mixed arbitral tribunals, profoundly shocking German leaders and scholars.
Mixed arbitral tribunals (MATs) were set up by peace treaties to determine the sums to be paid out to claimants. A core provision in the peace treaties was that allied governments reserved the right to retain and liquidate rights and interests in their territory belonging to German nationals, claiming them as reparations for the war. At same time, Germany was forced to restore the confiscated property of Allied nationals – as well as its nationals – in its own territory.Mixed arbitral tribunals, comprising legal representatives of the Central Power in question, the Allied Power of the claimant, and, as president, a lawyer of a neutral, third state, had to investigate the value of Allied property in each individual case. They were foreseen to be established between each of the Allied and Associated Powers on the one hand, and the Central Powers on the other, with 27 MATs envisioned for Germany alone. Only 11, however, were established with Germany, and 39 in total, as many countries decided to pursue other channels to settle the matter.
The MATs had their seats in Paris, London, Rome, and Geneva, and they used English, French, and Italian depending on the language of the claimant. This put German lawyers at a significant disadvantage, as they had to argue cases in foreign languages. Zollmann pointed out that the German Academic Exchange was established precisely in the context of Germany scrambling for linguistically competent lawyers. The busiest was the Polish-German MAT, which heard 30,000 claims. By 1930, 70,000 cases were adjudicated.
Furthermore, MAT procedures were barely defined by treaties and each tribunal set their own code of procedure. In a way, they became “factories of international law.” Due to the MATs being established on the basis of English and French law, the Germans found themselves on unequal footing. They complained of the one-sidedness of the Versailles system, labelling it “legal imperialism” and “a victor’s justice.” Nevertheless, they achieved some success in keeping the aggregate value of MAT compromises and rulings to 1 billion Reichsmarks, where 3-4 billion had been claimed.
The Paris Peace Treaties, however, also created a new reality in terms of borders and nationalities. Millions turned into ethnic minorities and hundreds of thousands left their new countries of abode. Depending on their new nationality, individuals were entitled to specific rights with regards to reparations. This generated a host of new problems of interpretation: What nationality was a bank whose shares were owned by Germans but was incorporated in London? Were the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine French or German?
Germany argued that the Franco-German MAT did not have jurisdiction over people in Alsace-Lorraine, since they were not French nationals when their property was requisitioned. The MAT decided, however, that these people had standing. In Eastern and Central Europe, the situation was at least as unclear, and was further complicated by the fact that hundreds of thousands became stateless and were lost in a legal no man’s land. Nevertheless, the Polish-German MAT differed from those dealing with Western countries, as it protected the claims of German nationals in former German territory that was awarded to Poland.
Zollmann concluded by noting that the MATs massively affected tens of thousands of people living in post-war territories. In Britain and France, they were seen as guarantors of justice, while Germany saw them as a tool of revenge. They institutionalised the right of individuals to lay claims against offending states and enshrined arbitration as a means of settling them.
Following the presentation, Cohrs made several observations, situating the content within the wider realm of transformative and unfinished processes in the legal and political realm. The First World War legalised international politics and brought ideas from the domestic level to the international realm. Furthermore, international law was politicised, or at least the process of its politicisation intensified. Various legal systems competed to become the law of humanity, with Western countries excluding Eastern Europe and the rest of the world from their consideration.
Cohrs observed that not just the Entente but also the Central Powers tried to invest the war effort with claims about justice. These were often culturally defined; the Western powers, for example, claimed to be defending Western civilisation against Huns and autocrats. Expectations for being able to dictate the form of post-war peace justified the sacrifices made during the war. As for the Americans, they saw Europe as a failing civilisation and wanted to institute their own laws as the international standard.
Cohrs asked whether there was a third, middle way to view the MATs. Were they ever viewed something between a “victor’s peace” and the epitome of justice? Zollmann responded that on the political level, there was never any doubt that Germany wanted to revoke the Treaty of Versailles. However, many also realised that their predicament was not a question of whether Versailles was good or bad. It was simply law and as such, the battles to be fought were legal ones. Germany took heart in the fact that only a quarter of the money claimed by MATs was actually awarded.
Questions from the audience also touched on the issue of neutrality. Zollmann pointed out that the neutrality of third-party arbiters has been disputed since ancient Greece. After the First World War, the German side often entertained the notion that it had been betrayed in MAT cases and often questioned the credentials of the third party MAT presidents.
Other audience members asked about the big picture: does the story of MATs fit into a larger narrative of steady progress or does it present a contradiction? Zollmann responded that rightly or wrongly, his book’s structure will impress upon the reader that the individual has risen in interstate arbitration. This progress story is not entirely wrong. Simultaneously, however, this is not the first time that international arbitration has dealt with individuals. Even at Westphalia, there were treaty, trade, and border issues with named claimants, and sometimes even arbitration by a third party. Nevertheless, the individual never really fit into the system of state-to-state relations before Versailles.
The next European Studies Centre seminar will take place on 21st February 2023. Click here for details.
Read more about the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals in Jakob Zollmann's entry in the Oxford University Press Encyclopedia of International Law
Ladislav Charouz (Research Assistant)
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