On the 29th of November 2022, the European Studies Centre hosted a talk entitled “Italy and the Future of the European Union.” The panel was chaired by Anna Chimenti (Academic Visitor, Saint Antony’s College, Oxford) and was attended by three speakers: Timothy Garton Ash (St Antony’s College, Oxford), Giuliano Amato (former Prime Minister of Italy), and Maurizio Molinari (Editor in Chief, La Repubblica). The current Ambassador of Italy to the United Kingdom, Indigo Lambertini, said a few words by way of introduction. He reminisced about meeting Molinari in Washington after the 9/11 attacks and credited the influence of Garton Ash with inspiring his diplomatic career. He highlighted instability both inside and outside the EU, saying that within his eight weeks as ambassador to the UK, he had already seen two Italian and two British governments.
The first speaker, Garton Ash, noted that he himself is not an expert on Italy and attended the panel only upon Amato’s insistence. Instead of delivering a presentation, he posed a “set of European questions” to the speakers. He contextualised these within the framework of two books: Molinari’s Il ritorno degli imperii (The Return of Empires) and his own From the Ruins of Empire. The whole history of Europe in the last 30 years, he hypothesized, was contained between these two books.
The first set of questions regarded the war in Ukraine. Will Italian military, economic, and diplomatic support for Ukraine last under Prime Minister Meloni? And, taking a broader geopolitical view, what position will Italy take on the restructuring, reform, and enlargement of the EU? Garton Ash pointed out that former Prime Minister Draghi was one of the first EU leaders to propose admitting Ukraine into the organisation, and supported the EU’s eastward expansion into the Balkans, Georgia, and Moldova. Before the war, Chancellor of Germany Olaf Scholz shared only the ambition to admit the Balkan countries. In his recent Prague speech, however, Scholz espoused Draghi’s vision.
The second question was about the East and the South, which form the permeable boundaries of the EU. The EU has a framework as regards the east: enlargement. However, there is no clear plan for the bloc’s southern members. Instead, the EU is building a new kind of iron curtain in the Mediterranean to deal with the so-called migration crisis. What is the broader strategic proposal for Europe’s policy towards its southern members and the Mediterranean?
Thirdly, what will Italy’s attitude be to building up European hard power? Will it support a Euro-Gaullist vision for Europe or an Atlanticist one? Garton Ash contextualised this question with reference to the emergent “Chinese Empire.” His fourth question concerned the economy and how Italy would seek reform and funding, especially with a decades-long reduction in GDP growth. Fifth, Garton Ash raised the question of populism on the right and far-right. Was the former far-right being socialised or normalised by the election of a post-neo fascist?
Finally, Garton Ash asked about the functioning and power dynamics of the EU after Brexit. Quoting Amato, he said the people always seek a constitutional analogy for the EU, but the EU is a UFO. Nevertheless, even this UFO has patterns: it works best with a combination of strong institutional leadership and a coalition of the willing among the major and other member states. The Franco-German-British ménage à trois enabled the EU’s smooth functioning: smaller countries could always turn to the third when initiatives proposed by the other two did not suit them. Without this internal balancing mechanism, leaving France and Germany alone is not working too well. Who will come in to restore the ménage à trois? Italy? Spain? Poland? Draghi’s premiership, and especially his leadership on Ukraine, showed that Italy is capable of performing this role.
Amato prefaced his speech by saying he would give his answers within a broader European framework. In moments of crisis, he said, the EU makes significant steps forward. Only then do member states themselves – not just the EU Parliament or Commission – find the will to adopt useful decisions for the future, one example being common contracts to buy vaccines. A few months later, however, we see this Hamiltonian atmosphere fading away. Europe is a victim of external shocks and events that produce asymmetric effects, creating new divergences in interests and means.
The first of these asymmetries is economic. Europe increasingly finds itself faced with a deglobalised world economy, in which the previous division of labour has been abandoned. Some countries need more external energy resources, while others (such as France with its nuclear power), need less. With the pandemic and the war, chains of production have been interrupted, and the products available in some countries are limited in others. During this crisis, the US has promised state aid to companies making products that are difficult to procure. In consequence, EU companies are investing more in the US than at home. Thus, we see a return to strategic autonomy in the production of both raw materials and industrial goods. The resultant asymmetry is driven by the fact that some countries, such as Italy, simply cannot invest in these capacities, while other European countries like Germany can.
Secondly, there are political and geopolitical asymmetries. The EU had tried in the past to treat Russia as a partner in commerce and trade and as an adversary in politics. Due to the war, however, this separation no longer works, and it is the EU’s eastern membership that drives stronger opposition to Russia than the West. The question, Amato said, is whether eastward expansion is still compatible with ever-closer integration. The Franco-German axis still functions, but what about the rest?
Amato then proceeded to look to the future and outlined some potential solutions to these asymmetries. The economic forecast for 2023, he said, looks grim. The cost of Europe’s debt will grow and the resources to repay the debt will not be generated by expected GDP growth. With the outcome of the war uncertain, the process of integration is in the hands of a future that it unknown. There are solutions, Amato said, but it is not clear whether Italy will support them.
With regards to the economy, it is time to introduce a central fiscal capacity in the EU. Only with a central fiscal capacity can resources be fairly distributed, stabilising the cycle of stagflation and producing European public goods. These would include not just abstract goods like defence and security, but also concrete ones like batteries, semi-conductors, hydrogen, and energy. Such an ambitious agenda cannot and should not be pursued only by the individual countries that can afford it; it must involve the whole of the European economy so as to prevent asymmetries from being driven further.
The political problem is much more difficult, as it involves a fundamental contradiction between expansion and closer integration. Amato said he did not see any solution but to use different schemes, arguing that when there are contradictions, a multiplicity of solutions is needed. The EU needs different platforms for cooperation, and indeed, in some ways it already does. Not all member states share the same currency and perhaps never will. There are and should be different areas of cooperation with regards to fiscal union, security, and immigration. Italy can play a role in these combinations, but its exact nature will depend on political majorities and personalities. It is unclear what role Meloni will play.
Molinari’s presentation focussed on addressing some of Garton Ash’s questions. With regards to Russia’s war against Ukraine and Italy’s attitude, Molinari was not optimistic. Meloni has openly declared her pro-NATO stance and supports weapons supplies to Ukraine as well as sanctions against Russia, but her coalition partners are sceptical. Until the very last day of the campaign, Salvini warned against sanctions and doubted the wisdom of sending weapons to Ukraine. Berlusconi, of course, has long been close to Putin and shares many of his views on the crisis. While Salvini’s and Berlusconi’s views do not represent those of their parties at large, Russia is happy with the current situation, expecting Italy to change its position very soon. Indeed, the Russian ambassador to Rome was heavily involved in the election campaign, encouraging Italian citizens to vote out Draghi. In short, Meloni will find it difficult to hold support for Ukraine across her coalition, but we will have a clearer idea of how matters stand following the parliamentary vote on continuing weapons exports.
Molinari went on to say that Italy is a battleground in Russia’s hybrid war against Western Europe. This war is fought with new weapons, such as social media, migration, and messages to leaders and parties in the populist arena that promote instability. Russia and China are major beneficiaries of this instability and use them to their own ends. They are not trying to break European alliances but try to win over assets within them. Thus, Greece votes against EU human rights resolutions concerning China and Hungary blocks meaningful proposals that go against Russia’s interests. If Russia succeeds in exporting instability and influence, Italy might go in much the same way.
On that note, Molinari commented that perhaps the greatest possible challenge to Russia’s hybrid war had been defused with the collapse of Draghi’s government. Draghi had proposed reversing the flow of gas in Europe from southwards to northwards, using Italy’s energy contracts with African countries. This plan would have significantly reduced EU dependency on Russia, and it won the support of both France and Germany, as well as the USA. Nevertheless, its implementation has faltered, and no one knows how courageous Meloni will be in standing up to Russian interests.
Regarding the EU’s southern strategy, Molinari noted that the region is part of a major strategic struggle with Russia. Noting the pattern of Russia’s recent military involvements (Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014, Syria in 2015, Libya in 2017, Mali in 2020, and the CAR in 2021), he argued that Russia invaded Ukraine for greater access to the sea. There are, he said, more Russian troops in and around the Mediterranean than there were during Soviet times. Since then, Russia has acquired a base in Libya and is much more active in Syria as well. Furthermore, Russia is increasingly using hybrid tools to pursue its goals. There is some evidence to suggest it has indirectly sponsored terrorism in Mali, and very clear evidence that it is weaponising migration against the West.
We must also, Molinari cautioned, consider other players in the region. Turkey is another country present in North Africa, and it is pursuing its own game with regards to Ukraine. On the one hand, it grants the country loans, while on the other, it does not respect the sanctions on Russia. Russia, in turn, considers Turkey one of the only partners with whom it can make deals on its wheat exports and more. China is another major Mediterranean player, but the implications of its interests are unclear. It sees itself as a great power that is able to project its interests in the very long term. Perhaps it may act as a partner to the West over Ukraine because of its desire to pursue its Belt and Road Initiative.
Finally, Molinari addressed the problem of populism. The people who voted for Meloni tend to come from rural Italy and belong to the country’s middle classes. Many of them are former voters of the Five Star Movement disillusioned with its lack of results. It is they who suffer from the country’s inequalities, which are so deep and complex that if Meloni does not succeed, it is possible that her voters will move to an even more extreme party than hers. Until the problems of these voters are solved, their protests will only grow bigger and the opportunities for autocracies to exploit Italy’s populism will multiply.
In the Q&A session, listeners asked numerous questions regarding Italy’s geopolitical orientation, the role of the US, attitudes towards the EU, and dealing with right-wing populism. The speakers agreed on the momentousness of Biden’s creation of the Community of Democracies. Molinari argued that the problems facing the Western world are not merely external but also internal and cannot be addressed singly. Regarding Italy’s European orientation, Amato said the country could not afford to abandon the European project given its economic difficulties. Garton Ash closed the discussion, noting that the future of the West depends on the non-West, and that the Community of Democracies was one factor among many in achieving its goals.
Ladislav Charouz (Research Assistant)
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