Monday, 16 February 2026

Sink or swim? The EU in a zero-sum world

On 10 February 2026, the European Studies Centre hosted a seminar on whether the European Union can adapt to an increasingly zero-sum international environment without abandoning the principles on which it was built. Chaired by Dimitar Bechev of St Antony's College, the discussion brought together Veronica Anghel of the European University Institute and Richard Youngs of the University of Warwick and Carnegie Europe to examine Europe's room for manoeuvre amid Russian aggression, an increasingly unpredictable United States and intensifying strategic competition with China. Across the panel, the central question was whether the European Union is simply reacting to mounting external pressures or beginning to develop a more purposeful strategic identity of its own.

Anghel opened by situating the discussion within a broader assessment of the risks confronting Europe. Drawing on a European University Institute survey of expert opinion, she argued that the greatest threat identified for 2026 was the possible withdrawal of American security guarantees to European allies. This concern sat alongside fears of a Russia-favourable outcome in Ukraine and the possibility of conflict over Taiwan, while also reflecting a deeper European uncertainty about the reliability of the United States as a long-term strategic partner. Together, these developments suggested that the European Union now faces a geopolitical environment fundamentally different from that of the post-Cold War period, one in which several major powers increasingly view Europe as something to be constrained, divided or marginalised.Against this backdrop, Anghel challenged what she described as the persistent myth of European weakness. Rather than failing to accumulate power after 1945, she argued, the European project had developed distinctive forms of influence that differ from conventional military capabilities: regulatory authority, market size, the coordination of complex supply chains and the capacity to impose economic costs through sanctions and other financial instruments. In her view, the EU is now beginning to translate these assets into a broader strategy of "total defence", combining resilience, deterrence and economic statecraft. Recent defence-industrial initiatives, closer cooperation with trusted partners and the decision to use frozen Russian assets in support of Ukraine all pointed towards a gradual deepening of integration in the service of collective security. Importantly, Anghel argued that this transformation is not only strategic but also political, as external threats have strengthened public support for common defence, enlargement and greater European autonomy.

Youngs broadly agreed that Europe must adapt to a more competitive geopolitical environment but offered a more cautious assessment of the Union's response. While acknowledging the growing emphasis on security and strategic autonomy, he questioned whether the EU had yet found an effective balance between defence, economic statecraft and its wider political identity. The principal danger, he argued, was not that Europe was becoming more strategic but that an increasingly dominant security agenda could crowd out the broader sources of European influence, particularly its long-standing role as a promoter of democracy and international cooperation. Many of the EU's newer partnerships, he suggested, remain relatively limited in substance, while Europe has yet to compensate meaningfully for the retreat of the United States from global democracy support. The challenge therefore lies in strengthening Europe's capacity for self-defence without allowing its external engagement to become narrowly transactional or exclusively security-driven.

Bechev's questions drew out several of the central tensions running through the discussion, particularly the relationship between security and prosperity, the implications of Europe increasingly being treated as a middle power, and the extent to which geopolitical urgency may require difficult trade-offs with the Union's universalist ambitions. Although the two speakers differed in emphasis, both recognised that Europe now faces pressure not only from external adversaries but also from shifting alliances and internal political fragilities. Anghel stressed that the Union's distinctive strength lies in its ability to stabilise international relations through institutions, rules and interdependence. Youngs, by contrast, warned that an increasingly selective and procedural understanding of international order risks weakening the normative foundations that have long underpinned Europe's global role.

The audience discussion broadened these themes to include economic autonomy, information warfare, democratic resilience, regional inequalities within Europe and the future of the rules-based international order. Responding to questions about cognitive warfare and online manipulation, Anghel argued that European institutions continue to confront twenty-first-century challenges with regulatory and institutional tools designed for an earlier era, particularly regarding social media platforms and Europe's continuing dependence on American digital infrastructure. Youngs similarly observed that many initiatives aimed at defending democracy remain primarily focused on countering external interference, even though some of the most serious threats to democratic resilience originate within European societies themselves. Other exchanges examined Russia's continuing significance as a security challenge, the limited resources available for democracy promotion beyond Europe, and whether the language of a "rules-based international order" continues to resonate politically. Once again, the discussion returned to a recurring theme of the seminar: Europe's future influence will depend not only on its material capabilities but also on how clearly it defines the principles it seeks to defend.

The seminar concluded without offering a simple answer to whether the European Union will ultimately "sink or swim", but it clarified the central questions shaping Europe's strategic future. First, both speakers agreed that Europe can no longer rely on inherited assumptions about the durability of the transatlantic security relationship. Second, the Union's emerging response is likely to depend less on replicating traditional forms of military power than on combining regulation, financial leverage, market influence and selective hardening into a distinctive model of geopolitical action. Finally, the discussion underscored that strategic adaptation alone will not be sufficient. Europe's longer-term position will depend equally on whether it seeks merely to protect itself within a more competitive international environment or to preserve—and renew—the broader political vision of democracy, international cooperation and rules-based order on which the European project has long rested.

By Yangyang Zhou (ESC Events Assistant)

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