Democratic resistance to illiberalism in Hungary and Serbia

On 25 November 2025, the ESC convened a comparative seminar on democratic resistance to illiberal rule. The seminar brought together Zoltán Ádám, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Political Science of ELTE University's Centre for Social Sciences, and Eric Gordy, Professor of Political and Cultural Sociology at University College London, with Jessie Barton Hronešová, Lecturer in Political Sociology at UCL, serving as discussant and Othon Anastasakis, Director of the ESC, chairing the event. The discussion examined how citizens, civic organisations and opposition actors in Hungary and Serbia confront entrenched regimes, combining detailed national case studies with a comparative perspective that highlighted both common patterns and important differences.

Ádám opened by tracing Hungary's political trajectory from the fiscal and political crises of 2006 to Fidesz's decisive electoral victory in 2010. He characterised the post-2010 system as a form of electoral autocracy, marked by patrimonial governance and increasingly sophisticated information management. Constitutional changes introduced under Fidesz's two-thirds parliamentary majority weakened domestic checks and balances, while European Union membership continued to function as an important, if limited, external constraint. Ádám argued that pre-election fiscal cycles and access to EU funds play a significant role in shaping public opinion, with consumer and business confidence closely tracking the government's electoral fortunes.He also examined the evolution of Hungary's opposition. After years of fragmentation among anti-Fidesz parties, new political forces have begun to reshape the electoral landscape. In particular, the movement led by Péter Magyar and the Tisza party has emerged as a potentially credible challenger in the next parliamentary election. Nevertheless, Ádám argued that the combination of institutional centralisation, media consolidation and administrative advantage means that only a disciplined and politically coherent opposition coalition is likely to mount a serious challenge to the incumbent regime.

Turning to Serbia, Gordy described a different model of authoritarian resilience. Rather than relying primarily on formal institutional control, the Serbian state, he argued, operates through dense networks of patronage and reciprocal exchange. Access to employment, public services and economic opportunity is frequently mediated through personal and party connections, encouraging citizens to support parties that can solve immediate practical problems rather than those offering ideological programmes. Gordy illustrated these dynamics through the example of the Novi Sad railway station collapse, which he linked to companies with close ties to the governing party. Student protests demanding transparency, accountability and criminal prosecutions subsequently developed into a wider movement challenging police violence and calling for early elections.

According to Gordy, the government's response has combined selective repression with engineered counter-mobilisation and the strategic use of state institutions and media. Rival pro-government student groups, organised counter-protests and episodes of political violence have complicated opposition strategy while reinforcing the regime's capacity to retain power. Even so, he argued that the protests have significantly weakened the government's legitimacy, despite the continued strength of its administrative and coercive resources.

In her response, Jessie Barton Hronešová drew the two cases together by highlighting both their similarities and their contrasts. Hungary and Serbia, she argued, both display electoral processes that preserve the appearance of democratic competition while masking deeper forms of institutional capture. Yet the mechanisms differ significantly. Hungary relies more heavily on legal and institutional change combined with extensive media control, creating a predominantly top-down model of authoritarian governance. Serbia, by contrast, depends more on informal patronage networks, creating greater opportunities for grassroots mobilisation while simultaneously enabling more fluid forms of co-option and political intimidation. Hronešová also argued that failures in public service delivery and persistent corruption represent important vulnerabilities in both systems, while the European Union continues to exert a limited but meaningful influence through financial conditionality and political signalling.

The discussion explored several practical implications of these comparisons. Participants questioned whether student movements can reliably be assumed to promote liberal democratic values, with the panel noting that the composition and leadership of such movements remain crucial to maintaining broad public support. Questions about electoral integrity in Hungary prompted the observation that, while voting and ballot counting are generally conducted in an orderly manner, the broader electoral environment is heavily shaped by media concentration, unequal access to resources and administrative pressure. Audience members also asked about the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church, with the panel arguing that the institution functions largely as a captured actor that supports the regime, despite the diversity of opinion among individual clergy and believers.

Several exchanges focused on the challenges of democratic transition itself. Removing an illiberal government, the speakers agreed, represents only the first stage of democratic renewal. Lasting reform requires dismantling entrenched patronage networks, rebuilding judicial independence and media pluralism, and restoring the effectiveness of public institutions. Broad opposition coalitions that focus solely on defeating the incumbent risk reproducing many of the same structural weaknesses if they lack a coherent programme for institutional reconstruction.

Three broader themes ultimately emerged from the seminar. First, the character of an illiberal regime shapes the strategies available to its opponents. More centralised systems of legal and institutional capture demand disciplined political organisation, whereas more informal, network-based systems create greater opportunities for broad civic mobilisation. Second, failures in everyday governance—from healthcare and education to infrastructure and public administration—constitute some of the most significant vulnerabilities facing illiberal governments. Patronage and propaganda may obscure these shortcomings for a time, but they cannot eliminate them. Finally, while external actors, particularly the European Union, can help constrain democratic backsliding through conditionality and political pressure, international influence remains uneven and rarely decisive on its own. The seminar therefore pointed towards the need for context-specific responses that combine effective political strategy with institutional reform and sustained international engagement, while reminding participants that democratic resilience ultimately depends as much on implementation and governance as on constitutional design.

By Yangyang Zhao (Events Assistant)