European security transformed
Olya Oliker opened the seminar by noting that Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine fundamentally transformed Europe’s security order. What was once considered a “settled” system has been replaced by continuing conflict and uncertainty.
Before 2022, perceptions of Russia varied: while the Baltic States and Poland saw Moscow as a potential aggressor, others considered it dangerous but manageable. Even the annexation of Crimea in 2014 did not fully change that view.
The 2022 invasion, she argued, shattered these assumptions. Russia demonstrated its willingness to use force despite immense costs, breaking prior commitments and underestimating both its adversaries and its own limitations. Deterrence now requires a higher threshold than previously imagined.Russia’s proposal to roll back NATO deployments to their 1999 status and its nuclear rhetoric raised existential concerns among smaller European states, prompting Finland and Sweden to seek NATO membership. While Moscow’s nuclear threats proved largely non-credible, its actions cemented a new era of enduring deterrence on both sides.
Russian and Western Misperceptions
Oliker explained that Russian threat perceptions remain rooted in the belief that the United States seeks to coerce and weaken Moscow. The Kremlin’s worldview—where respect must be earned through dominance and smaller states are treated as vassals—has changed little. Misreading Western intentions and overestimating its own capacity contributed directly to the invasion.
She outlined two enduring differences in perception:
How wars begin. Western planners often imagine small, incremental conflicts; Russia anticipates large-scale attacks and plans for early nuclear escalation.
The “Trump factor.” A potential return of Donald Trump introduces new uncertainty over U.S. commitments. Moscow now increasingly views Europeans, not only Americans, as obstacles to its ambitions.
Transatlantic strains and U.S. politics
Jim O’Bryan emphasised that Russia’s strategic aims remain consistent—President Putin seeks respect and parity with Washington. Yet today, no effective diplomatic dialogue exists. The war revealed Russia’s economic and technological weaknesses and its dependence on China, making old diplomatic frameworks difficult to revive.
Reflecting on his experience during U.S. political transitions, O’Bryan recalled how commercial rather than strategic thinking dominated discussions with Trump’s team. He warned that a second Trump administration could further disrupt transatlantic ties—not merely through personality or style, but by undermining shared values and the public-goods infrastructure underpinning Western cooperation.
He identified key stress points for U.S.–European relations: potential economic crises, cultural polarisation, and the erosion of trust. Despite these challenges, he noted areas of enduring alignment—defence, technology, and inequality-driven politics—that could provide a foundation for renewed partnership.
Ukraine’s role and agency
The discussion turned to Ukraine’s agency amid the conflict. Both speakers agreed that President Zelensky has earned significant credibility through the country’s resilience. Oliker described him as an engaging communicator but not a natural manager; his leadership endures largely because there is no clear alternative. O’Bryan noted that Ukraine’s battlefield achievements have strengthened its international standing but highlighted the importance of maintaining domestic feedback mechanisms and long-range deterrent capabilities.
Europe’s Security Without the U.S.?
In a wide-ranging Q&A, participants examined NATO’s capacity to sustain deterrence if U.S. support wanes. O’Bryan questioned whether Europe can maintain strategic focus and provide collective “public goods” in defence without American leadership. Oliker added that while Russia recognises the risks of escalation, the credibility of Europe’s independent deterrent—particularly nuclear guarantees—remains uncertain.
Both speakers agreed that if NATO fractures, smaller regional conflicts could re-emerge. The challenge for Europe is to preserve credible deterrence and cohesive defence planning in a less U.S.-centred security order.
Regional and long-term perspectives
Further questions explored Russia’s military effectiveness, the future of Ukraine’s EU membership prospects, and the role of Balkan states. Oliker cautioned against overestimating Russia’s battlefield innovation, while O’Bryan underscored the enduring problem of corruption and patronage networks in Southeastern Europe. Both agreed that sustained European engagement will be essential to avoid renewed instability.
Conclusion
The seminar underscored that Europe’s security future will be shaped by enduring deterrence, the uncertain trajectory of U.S. politics, and the outcome of the war in Ukraine. As both speakers made clear, the challenge for Europe is to adapt strategically—building resilience, deepening cooperation, and ensuring that the lessons of Ukraine extend “beyond” to a more secure European order.
by Jonathan Scheele (ESC Associate)
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