Shifting Support: Western states, the UN, and local perceptions in conflict zones

At this seminar on 12 October, Stefano Costalli (University of Florence) presented joint research with Irene Costantini (University of Naples L’Orientale) and Valerio Vignoli (University of Siena) exploring how local communities perceive and evaluate international interventions in conflict settings. Drawing on a unique survey experiment conducted in Mali, the study sheds new light on the interplay between identity, effectiveness, and integrity in shaping local support for external actors such as the UN, Western powers, and non-Western states. Federica Genovese (St Antony’s College, Oxford) chaired the talk.

From peacekeeping to multipolar interventions
Costalli opened by situating the study in the broader evolution of peacekeeping and intervention research. Although UN peace operations have long been the cornerstone of international conflict management, no new UN missions have been launched since 2014 despite ongoing crises. Increasingly, non-UN actors—from regional organizations to individual states—have taken the lead in military interventions. Yet, much of the literature still analyses interventions from a supply-side perspective, focusing on the interveners rather than the societies affected by them.

The team’s project aims to reverse this imbalance by centring local perceptions and agency. Their approach moves beyond measuring peacekeeping “effectiveness” in terms of reduced violence, asking instead how affected communities perceive different interveners and what factors drive their willingness to support or reject them.Theory: Identity, effectiveness, and integrity
The authors propose a framework in which local support depends on three dimensions:

1. Identity – how populations view the intervener’s values, history, and capabilities before intervention;
2. Effectiveness – whether the actor is perceived as achieving its mandate, improving security, and assisting civilians;
3. Integrity – whether intervening forces behave appropriately and avoid misconduct such as abuse, corruption, or civilian harm.

They hypothesise that interventions by international organizations (IOs) should generally attract higher approval than those by individual states, but that non-Western powers may gain relatively greater support in post-colonial contexts. Conversely, breaches of integrity can erode trust, particularly for actors otherwise viewed positively.

 
Case study: Mali
Mali provides an ideal test case. Since 2012, the country has hosted multiple foreign interventions: France’s Operation Serval and later Barkhane, the UN’s MINUSMA mission, ECOWAS deployments, and most recently the involvement of Russian forces, including the Wagner Group (now the “Africa Corps”). This layered history makes Mali a microcosm of today’s internationalized civil conflicts—complex arenas where global and regional powers vie for influence

Between May and June 2025, the research team conducted a survey experiment with 1,600 respondents across the regions of Gao and Mopti. Using randomized treatments, participants were asked whether they would support interventions by France, Russia, the UN, or ECOWAS, under different scenarios of effectiveness and integrity. Responses were measured on a five-point Likert scale from “not at all” to “yes, a lot”.

Findings
The descriptive analysis reveals striking patterns (see charts):

• Russia received the highest mean levels of support among tested actors, while France and the UN scored significantly lower.
• Perceived effectiveness consistently boosts approval across all actors—showing that competence on the ground can outweigh initial reputational disadvantages.
• Conversely, evidence of misconduct sharply reduces support, especially for actors that began with higher credibility, highlighting how fragile perceived integrity can be.

Regression analyses further show that local factors such as region, gender, political knowledge, and prior exposure to violence also condition attitudes toward foreign actors.

 
Conclusions
The study concludes that the identity of interveners remains a central determinant of local support but operates in interaction with perceptions of performance and behaviour. Interventions by IOs are not automatically viewed more favourably than those by individual states, and non-Western powers—particularly Russia—can enjoy relatively high approval in specific contexts.

Ultimately, effectiveness and integrity matter most: actors seen as capable and respectful win legitimacy, while failures or abuses quickly erode it. These findings underline the need to place local voices at the centre of policy and academic debates about peacebuilding and international intervention.

by Julie Adams (ESC Administrator)