What can opinion polls tell us about Europe in a changing world?

The European Studies Centre (ESC) discussed on 16 January 2024 the results of two opinion poll surveys conducted as part of the Dahrendorf Programme. One of the opinion polls was conducted by the European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR) and measured public opinion of the United States (US), the European Union (EU), Russia, China, India, South Africa, South Korea, Brazil, Indonesia, and Türkyie on questions related to the role of the US, EU, Ukraine, and Russia. The other poll was conducted by the Eupinions programme at the Bertelsmann Stiftung and measured public opinion within EU states on the support for Ukraine. The results of the first poll were presented by Ivan Krastev, director of Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia and Permanent Fellow at the Institute of Human Sciences. The main results of the second poll were presented by Isabelle Hoffmann, founder of the Eupionions programme. The seminar was chaired by Timothy Garton Ash, Professor of European Studies, St. Antony’s College, Oxford.

Krastev underscored that the main purpose of the polling was to understand more the “mood” rather than the “opinion” of the public in the selected countries. Krastev further noted in India the vast majority of the citizens were more optimistic about their country’s future, while in Türkyie and the EU most of the citizens (58-59%) felt pessimistic. More generally, Asian countries – except for South Korea – were more optimistic than the US and EU. According to Krastev, this is a reflection of the general feeling of the collapse of the Western order.

On the question of the partnership with China vs the US, Krastev argued that there is only one area where China is perceived as competitive as the West: trade. On migration preferences and security cooperation, however, he argued that the US and Europe still hold their appeal in most of the polled countries. Nevertheless, countries do want to benefit from trade with China, and would not like to be forced to choose between China and the US.Krastev further argued that the most important propaganda success of the Russian government has been to convince the Russian people and a large part of the world that Russia is at war with NATO, not Ukraine, but the war is taking place in Ukrainian territory. Consequently, only in the US more than 50 percent of the public think that the US is not at war with Russia. In the same way think 46 percent of the citizens of the EU, but 36 percent think that the US is at war with Russia. Meanwhile, in Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Türkyie, and South Africa, the majority of the public think that the US is indeed at war with Russia. Similarly, except for the US, EU, South Korea, and Brazil, the public in the rest of the polled countries think that Ukraine, EU or the US are a greater obstacle to peace than Russia.

A similar East-West divide was noticeable also concerning the EU’s political standing or its likelihood to crumble in the future. Krastev noted that those who think European power is collapsing are more likely to think that Russia will likely win the war.

Hoffmann made a few observations about the mood of the public of EU member states. First, she cautioned not to overestimate or underestimate public opinion polls, and she argued that public opinion that public opinion is much less volatile than it is assumed.

After the war in Ukraine, the questions asked were related to support for Ukraine, the stress or anxiety levels of the public, and these data were correlated to understand whether anxiety levels explained the level of support for Ukraine.

Hoffmann noted that European stress level are high, but argued that this didn’t make a difference with regard to the support for Ukraine. Approximately 69 percent of those who were anxious agreed that the attack on Ukraine was an attack on Europe and that the Ukrainians had a right to defend themselves.

Despite generally being supportive of Ukraine, when asked about economic aspects of support for Ukraine – particularly reconstruction and the effectiveness of economic sanctions on Russia – respondents seemed more reluctant to agree that on the right course of action. Furthermore, there has been declining support on Ukraine-related issues even among some of its staunch supporters in the EU. Support for refugees in Poland has dropped 20 percent (from 80 to 60) in the last two months. Similarly, support for weapons deliveries to Ukraine decreased in the last two months from almost 90 percent to 73 percent. In other countries, Germany and Italy, support is weaker.

The discussion that followed the presentations was focused on the reliability of polling, reading public opinion polling results, accounting for the influence of the historical experiences of the respondents, and the decline of the West in the Global South. According to Krastev, the view of the Global South on the Ukraine war will not change regardless of what Russia, the EU or Ukraine do. Krastev argued also that Western influence is declining because the countries in the Global South do not think in terms of models and do not believe that should be forced to choose one model or the other. They would rather borrow what suits them.

By Alban Dafa (ESC Research Assistant)